Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Jacob Zenn
There
is reason to believe that the leadership of Barnawi’s faction retains a latent
affinity for al-Qaeda, even though they are now publicly loyal to Baghdadi.
This can be seen in the pedigree of Barnawi’s faction, which recalls previous factions
that sought to rival Shekau.
Since
Shekau assumed leadership of Boko Haram in 2010 after Nigerian security forces
killed Mohammed Yusuf (Barnawi’s father), two main rival factions have
contested Shekau’s leadership. In 2011, the Yusufiya
Islamic Movement distributed flyers in Borno State criticizing
Shekau’s killing of innocent Muslim civilians. In 2012, Ansaru
announced its formation in Kano after Shekau ordered an attack in the city that
killed more than 200 people, mostly Muslims. Ansaru’s Nigerian leaders had been
trained by AQIM, and subscribed to al-Qaeda’s limitations on targeting
civilians (relative to the Islamic State).
Yet,
like the Yusufiya Islamic Movement before it, Ansaru eventually became largely
dormant — due to Shekau killing its members, Nigerian counterterrorism
operations against its cells, and the disruption of AQIM’s networks in Mali
after the French-led intervention in 2013. As the environment for AQIM became
more permissive in Mali in 2014-15, external support for Ansaru resumed, and
the group was attempting to reassert itself up until its leader Khalid
al-Barnawi was captured in early 2016.
Shekau thus retained Boko Haram’s
dominant leadership position in the face of these challenges, and even
incorporated some Ansaru defectors into its ranks ahead of Boko Haram’s push to
join the Islamic State in 2015. This may have been a marriage of convenience
for Ansaru members who were on the run — as well as a desire for survival, safe
haven, and access to greater resources — rather than a sign of true loyalty to
Shekau. Thus, the fact that Abu Musab al-Barnawi’s faction has ascended to Boko
Haram’s leadership today at the expense of the deposed Shekau represents the
first time a rival faction has overcome Shekau.
Barnawi’s
understanding of theology and strategy resembles that of the Yusufiya Islamic
Movement and Ansaru. His allies include AQIM-trained Mamman Nur and the
above-mentioned Abu Fatima, who was Ansaru’s
commander of suicide operations. Moreover, his first
video appearance in January 2015 carried some hallmarks of Ansaru
messaging. Thus, the current Boko Haram leadership under Barnawi appears to be
neo-Ansaru in ideology, but nonetheless expresses its loyalty to the Islamic
State.
This apparent paradox can be resolved through one of two explanations.
First, a number of
AQIM factions and “front groups” in northwest Africa have joined the
Islamic State out of a shared vision of an Islamic state, but not due to a
truly shared ideology. Barnawi is in accord with the Islamic State in the
desire for declaration of sharia-based governance in West Africa. Barnawi’s
“switch” from al-Qaeda to the Islamic State is thus consistent with some
shifting jihadist loyalties in the region, as well as Barnawi’s short-term
objectives. Second, and more sinister from the Islamic State’s perspective,
Barnawi’s faction may have joined with Shekau in order to finally depose him.
To formalize a relationship with the Islamic State, Barnawi’s faction had to
merge with Shekau’s to show the Islamic State that Boko Haram had sufficient
unity in its ranks to make the pledge. By merging with Shekau under this
“general command” while controlling the connections to the Islamic State,
Barnawi’s faction was able to bring in Shekau before the pledge but also cut
him off from communicating with the Islamic State afterward. Barnawi’s faction
apparently convinced the Islamic State to remove Shekau from his leadership
role in favor of Barnawi.
While
the idea of Barnawi being motivated to join the Islamic State in order to
overthrow Shekau may seem conspiratorial, it is consistent with Boko Haram’s
ongoing internal intrigues under Shekau. To a lesser extent, it is also
consistent with a trend of al-Qaeda members infiltrating Islamic State
provinces to weaken, divide, and sow discord in the movement’s ranks. This has
occurred in upstart Islamic State provinces in Yemen and Afghanistan — and even
at the highest levels of the group, as evidenced by the presence of the high-level
dissident and “whistleblower” known by his Twitter handle @wikibaghdady.
Thus,
Barnawi’s faction appears to have killed two birds with one stone. It joined
the Islamic State, with whom it shared a vision of announcing an Islamic state
in West Africa, and it marginalized Shekau. The Islamic State’s provinces in
Libya were supposed to provide new resources and weapons to Boko Haram, but
this never panned out: There has been no influx of
funds or foreign fighters.
If
the Islamic State can provide Bko Haram with no further resources or support,
there may be little incentive for it to remain with the Islamic State in the
long term. Barnawi may even switch his allegiance to al-Qaeda — even if he is
not open about such association, a model al-Qaeda is clearly moving
toward with the Nusra Front’s recent “dissociation.” Al-Qaeda’s
affiliates are waging an increasingly powerful insurgency in nearby Mali, and a
switch to al-Qaeda would also allow Barnawi to receive resources from al-Qaeda
in Mali. An alliance with al-Qaeda also would be more consistent with Barnawi’s
vision and ideology.
Barnawi’s
appreciation of al-Qaeda was subtly evident in his August 3
interview with the Islamic State, when the group named him Boko
Haram’s new wali. In it, Barnawi noted that after Mohammed Yusuf was killed,
Boko Haram’s “soldiers were sent to the Greater Sahara to be trained there [by
al-Qaeda], and transitioned from the stage of guerrilla warfare to the stage of
empowerment and spreading control.” Thus, Barnawi likely still owes a debt to
al-Qaeda for helping his father’s followers after Mohammed Yusuf’s death.
To
win out over the Islamic State in Nigeria, all al-Qaeda has to do sit on the
sidelines and watch Boko Haram fall apart, and patiently wait to capitalize.
Boko Haram’s state opponents should watch for signs of such a realignment. Boko
Haram’s reintegration into al-Qaeda’s network could give the Nigerian jihadist
group an immediate boost by linking it to the growing Malian insurgency. It
could also signal that the Islamic State no longer poses as much of a challenge
to al-Qaeda’s global network, since Boko Haram has been the most prominent
franchise that the Islamic State lured to its network. Losing Boko Haram would
thus be a potent signal of the Islamic State’s decline.
Further,
though the United States and its allies have found it notoriously difficult to
capitalize on fissures within and among jihadist groups, the rivalries and
maneuvering within Boko Haram demonstrate the strategic importance of internal
dissension and realignment. Boko Haram’s defection to the Islamic State
deprived it of al-Qaeda’s resources, which were more potent locally. And at
this point disunity within Boko Haram is undeniable. Whether that makes Boko
Haram less of a threat, or in the longer
term creates greater dangers, remains to be seen. But scholars of
sub-state violence should certainly be following developments in Nigeria to
extract important lessons about disunity in militant groups.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Chief Executive Officer of Valens Global, a consulting firm that focuses on the challenges posed by violent non-state actors. Jacob Zenn is a Fellow of African Affairs at The Jamestown Foundation, a Senior Consultant at Valens Global, and an Adjunct Assistant Professor at Georgetown University, where he co-teaches a course on violent non-state actors with Gartenstein-Ross. Zenn also works on projects in countering violent extremism in Nigeria.
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